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Weekly Commentary
Elements of a Sensible Iran Policy
On Sunday, Iran admitted that it had achieved proficiency in the
full range of activities in enriching uranium. Several top
Iranian nuclear negotiators had previously admitted that the
clerical regime was not at such a point in October 2003 when
they signed a nuclear agreement with Europe’s big-3.
The loophole-laden agreement left lots of wiggle room for
Tehran, effectively providing perfect diplomatic cover for the
mullahs to gain the most precious thing they needed to advance
their weapons program: Time
If in fact Tehran has now “achieved proficiency” in enriching
uranium, the EU-3 must accept responsibility, considering their
“soft power” nuclear diplomacy since October 2003. By giving
Iran yet another diplomatic olive branch, the EU-troika made it
easy for Tehran to continue its nuclear hide-and-cheat game and
“achieve proficiency.”
When it comes to ideologically driven rogue regimes, the bitter
truth is that appeasement is an exercise in futility. The root
cause of the nuclear crisis with Iran is not a shortage of
“economic incentives”; it is the nature of regime in power in
Tehran.
In formulating a viable solution to the mullahs’ nuclear
challenge, the United States must take into account the
following:
1- Having a nuclear arsenal is at the heart of Iran’s foreign
policy doctrine. Iran has been seeking political and military
regional hegemony - a cornerstone of the Khomeini’s vision for
an Islamic Empire - since 1979.
2- The depraved nature of the fundamentalist terrorist regime in
Tehran is the cause of the nuclear crisis with Iran, its
sponsorship of terrorism, export of fundamentalism to Iraq and
beyond, and crackdown on political dissent at home.
3- To assume that the mullahs abide by their international
obligations, is at best naive. No amount of incentives would
convince Tehran to do otherwise.
4- Diplomatic engagement, and all of its aliases such as “grand
bargain” and “direct dialogue,” must therefore be thrown out the
door.
5- Given their lucrative trade with Tehran and geopolitical
jockeying in the region, the EU countries have self-serving
reasons for their “soft approach” toward Tehran. The specter of
a nuclear-armed Iran is far too ominous to let appeasers in the
EU dictate the policy on Iran.
6- Serious consideration must be given to suggestions that
Iran’s nuclear threat and its sponsorship of terror could only
be halted through a regime change by Iranians and democratic
opposition groups.
7- Unlike its neighbors to the east and west, Iran has a
century-long history of relentless struggle against despotism.
The call for regime change in Iran goes back to more than two
decades. Tens of thousands of Iranian democracy activists have
been sent to the gallows and thousands more have languished in
prisons.
8- That said, any meaningful option on Iran must by necessity
include reaching out to Iranian democratic and
anti-fundamentalist opposition groups who have been fighting for
a secular and representative government for the past quarter
century. We must help create a better balance of power between
the regime and its opposition.
The sooner we grasp the sheer extent of the destructive and
multi-facetted threat Iran poses to the well-being of Iranians
and to the security and stability of the region, the sooner we
would realize that the call by Iranians for a regime change must
be heeded and the door to engagement of Iran’s tyrant rulers
must be shut. (USADI)
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The Washington Times
March 3, 2005
Carrots for
Tehran?
Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, under fire from Washington for failing to
vigorously challenge Iran's nuclear-weapons program, are taking
a tougher line toward Tehran. As President Bush and Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice prepare to discuss joining the European
Union's efforts to use some incentives to persuade Iran to
change its behavior, they must certainly keep in mind the
mounting evidence that Tehran has never come clean about its
nuclear program and shows no inclination to cooperate with
international inspectors. In the wake of new revelations that in
1987, at the height of Iran's war with Iraq, the regime was
approached by aides to A.Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani nuclear
scientist at the center of a nuclear smuggling network, a senior
diplomat close to the IAEA suggested Monday that there is ample
reason to be suspicious of the Iranian government's behavior…
But Iran is doing everything it can to frustrate the IAEA. On
Tuesday, IAEA Deputy Director-General Pierre Goldschmidt
delivered a report to the agency's board of governors in Vienna
documenting how Iran continues to stonewall and prevent
inspectors from traveling to suspected weapons sites. For
example, Iran refused to answer IAEA questions about dual-use
material and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment
at Lavizan, a suspected weapons site in Tehran, and a military
facility at Parchin, where the United States charges that Iran
is simulating atomic-weapons tests.
At Parchin, IAEA inspectors who went there in January were only
permitted to visit a small percentage of the locations where
weapons activity is believed to be taking place. According to
Mr. Goldschmidt, of the four areas at the facility the IAEA
identified as being of potential interest, Iran only permitted
inspectors to visit one. On Sunday, Iran denied an IAEA request
to conduct a follow-up visit.
Even if Iran were to miraculously respond to Washington and
European promises of unspecified rewards for shutting down its
nuclear-weapons program, another question needs to be answered:
What would the allies do if Tehran, after jettisoning nuclear
weapons, continued to promote terrorism by supporting Hezbollah
and other terrorists? There are myriad real-world obstacles, all
of them relating to Iranian behavior, to any rapprochement
between this Iranian government and the West.
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Newsday
March 3, 2005
Iran sends killers abroad to
silence dissent
QUETTA, Pakistan - When Abdulrahim Raeesi, an Iranian political
science professor, wrote in an underground newspaper that Iran
needs more democracy, men from the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security soon found him. They arrested and tortured him, so
badly, he said, that he had to be hospitalized. Last year,
Raeesi escaped from the hospital and fled with his wife and son
across the desert into Pakistan to seek political asylum.
A few months later, he said, the secret police reached him
again. Men with Iranian accents began calling his telephone,
warning him to return to Iran and surrender.
"'Do you think you're safe?' they asked me" in an e-mail
message, Raeesi said. "`We have a group for you. Don't make us
send this group to get you.'"
Raeesi sent his family to shelter with friends, but he stayed in
Quetta to pursue his plea for asylum with the U.N. refugee
agency here.
On Feb. 7, men with guns kicked in the flimsy door of the grubby
rented room that Raeesi shared with two other Iranian
asylum-seekers. One roommate, Ahmed Mashoof, was killed in a
volley of bullets. Raeesi and the other roommate escaped,
scampering from a courtyard to the rooftop.
While enforcers of Iran's conservative ruling mullahs killed
scores of dissidents overseas in the 1980s and '90s, the
shooting last month was the first such attack in years. It has
raised fears that Iran's secret police forces, emboldened by a
widening crackdown on dissent at home, may resume hunting and
killing dissidents abroad…
For the past five years, the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security, the Revolutionary Guard militia and more informal
groups loyal to the mullahs have stepped up intimidation and
attacks on political dissidents and religious and ethnic
minorities.
On Nov. 10, Amnesty International cited new reports of "around
25 Internet journalists and civil society activists arbitrarily
arrested in recent weeks," saying it was evidence of "an
alarming rise in human rights violations in Iran."
With the Quetta attack "the uptick in repression at home may now
be leading to an uptick in killings abroad," said Allister
Hodgett, an Amnesty International spokesman in Washington. A
Pakistani intelligence official said security agencies here
believe the attack was conducted either by Iran's intelligence
ministry or by local gunmen it hired.
Pakistani officials say as many as 20,000 Iranians have settled
in this country, mostly to escape harassment or the threat of
arrest for their political, religious or ethnic affiliations.
But UNHCR says it recognizes only 57 Iranians in Pakistan as
refugees eligible for asylum...
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Associated Press
March 7, 2005
Iran Confirms Underground Nuke
Plant
NATANZ -- An Iranian official confirmed Monday that a uranium
enrichment plant in central Iran is underground as a protection
against airstrikes, but insisted that is not a sign the program
aims to produce nuclear weapons.
U.S. officials have said building nuclear facilities underground
is inconsistent with Iran’s contention its atomic program is
intended only for the generation of electricity. The Iranians
deny Washington’s accusation that they are trying to build
nuclear weapons.
Ali Akbar Salehi, a nuclear affairs adviser to the foreign
minister, said U.S. and Israeli threats forced Iran to take
precautions to protect its technology, including the string of
centrifuges used to enrich uranium — a process that can produce
fuel for nuclear reactors that generate electricity but also
make material suitable for atomic warheads.
It was the first public confirmation by Iran that the Natanz
facility is underground.
On Saturday, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani,
confirmed Iran is building a tunnel next to another nuclear
facility in Isfahan. He said that the tunnel, under a mountain,
will be used to store unspecified equipment and that air attacks
would not be able to destroy it.
The central cities of Natanz and Isfahan house the heart of
Iran’s nuclear program. The conversion facility in Isfahan
reprocesses uranium ore concentrate, known as yellowcake, into
uranium hexaflouride gas. The gas is then taken to Natanz and
fed into the centrifuges for enrichment.
The facility at Natanz is at the foot of a mountain in an
otherwise barren desert some 200 miles south of the capital,
Tehran. Some of its buildings, which are believed to be
administrative offices, are visible from the main road running
from Kashan to Natanz.
There are military bases not far from the facility. Travelers
who stop on the road close to the facility are approached by
security officers in plainclothes and asked to leave.
Iran began its nuclear program in secrecy, and now says it has
achieved proficiency in the full range of activities involved in
enriching uranium.
Iran’s former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, said Sunday that
Iran initially developed the program in secret and bought
nuclear materials on the black market because of U.S. sanctions
and European restrictions that denied Iran access to advanced
civilian nuclear technology.
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